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Abstract
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and
these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. e goal is to match every
agent to a single item so as to maximize the social welfare. Most of the related literature, however,
assumes that the values of the agents are not a priori known, and only access to the ordinal preferences
of the agents over the items is provided. Consequently, this incomplete information leads to loss of
efficiency, which is measured by the notion of distortion. In this paper, we further assume that the agents
can answer a small number of queries, allowing us partial access to their values. We study the interplay
between elicited cardinal information (measured by the number of queries per agent) and distortion for
one-sided matching, as well as a wide range of well-studied related problems. alitatively, our results
show that with a limited number of queries, it is possible to obtain significant improvements over the
classic seing, where only access to ordinal information is given.
1 Introduction
In the one-sided matching problem (oen referred to as the house allocation problem), n agents have pref-
erences over a set of n items, and the goal is to find an allocation in which every agent receives a single
item, while maximizing some objective. Typically, as well as in this paper, this objective is the (utilitarian)
social welfare, i.e., the total utility of the agents. Since its introduction by Hylland and Zeckhauser [1979],
this has been one of the most fundamental problems in the literature of economics (e.g., see [Bogomolnaia
and Moulin, 2001, Svensson, 1999]), and has also been extensively studied in computational social choice
(e.g., see [Klaus et al., 2016]).
e classic work on the problem (including Hylland and Zeckhauser’s seminal paper) assumes that
the preferences of the agents are captured by cardinal valuation functions, assigning numerical values to
the different items; these can be interpreted as their von Neuman-Morgenstern utilities [Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1947]. From a more algorithmic viewpoint, one can envision a weighted complete bipartite
∗ G. Amanatidis has been partially supported by the NWO Veni project VI.Veni.192.153. G. Birmpas has been supported by
the ERC Advanced Grant 788893 AMDROMA “Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets”, and the MIUR
PRIN project ALGADIMAR “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets”.
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graph (with agents and items forming the two sides of the partition), where the weights of the edges are
given by these values. Crucially, most of the related literature assumes that the designer only has access to
the preference rankings of the agents over the items (i.e., the ordinal preferences) induced by the underlying
values, but not to the values themselves.1 is is motivated by the fact that it is fairly standard to ask the
agents to simply order the items, while it is arguably much more demanding to require them to specify
exact numerical values for all of them.
is begs the following natural question: What is the effect of this limited information on the goals of
the algorithm designer? In 2006, Procaccia and Rosenschein defined the notion of distortion to measure
precisely this effect, when the goal is to maximize the social welfare. eir original research agenda was
put forward for seings in general social choice (also referred to as voting), but has since then flourished
to capture several different scenarios, including the one-sided matching problem. For the laer problem,
Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2014], showed that the best possible distortion achieved by any ordinal algorithm is
Θ(
√
n), even if one allows randomization, and even if the valuations are normalized. For deterministic
algorithms, the corresponding bound is Θ(n2) (eorem 1).
While the aforementioned bounds establish a stark impossibility when one has access only to ordinal
information, they do not rule out the prospect of good approximations when it is possible to elicit some
cardinal information. Indeed, the cognitive burden of eliciting cardinal values in the literature has mostly
been considered in the two extremes; either full cardinal information or not at all. Conceivably though, if
the agents needed to come up with only a few cardinal values, the elicitation process would not be very
demanding, while it could potentially have wondrous effects on the social welfare. is approach was
advocated recently by Amanatidis et al. [2020], who proposed to study the tradeoffs between the number
of cardinal value queries per agent and distortion. For the general social choice seing of Procaccia and
Rosenschein [2006], Amanatidis et al. [2020] actually showed that with a limited number of such queries,
one can significantly improve upon the existing strong impossibilities [Boutilier et al., 2015, Caragiannis
et al., 2017]. Motivated by the success of this approach for general social choice seings, we extend this
research agenda and aim to answer the following question for the one-sided matching problem:
What are the best possible information-distortion tradeoffs in one-sidedmatching? Canwe achieve
significant improvements over the case of only ordinal preferences, by making only a few cardinal
value queries per agent?
1.1 Our Contribution
We consider the one-sided matching problem with the goal of maximizing the social welfare under limited
information. We adopt the standard assumption in the related literature that the agents provide as input
their ordinal preferences over the items, and that these are induced by their cardinal valuation functions.
Following the agenda put forward by Amanatidis et al. [2020], we also assume implicit access to the nu-
merical values of the agents via value queries; we may ask for an agent i and an item j, and obtain the
agent’s value, vi(j), for that item.
We measure the performance of an algorithm by the standard notion of distortion, and our goal is
to explore the tradeoffs between distortion and the number of queries we need per agent. As the two
extremes, we note that if we use n queries per agent, we recover the complete cardinal valuation profile
and thus the distortion is 1, whereas if we use 0 queries, i.e., we use only the ordinal information, the
best possible distortion is Θ(n2) (see eorem 1). e laer bound holds even if we consider valuation
functions that satisfy the unit-sum normalization, i.e., the sum of the values of each agent for all the items
1 e pseudo-market mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser [1979] is a notable exception to this.
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is 1. As we mentioned earlier, even when allowing randomization, the best possible distortion is still quite
large (Θ(
√
n) [Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2014]) without employing any value queries. In this work, we only
consider deterministic algorithms, and leave the study of randomized algorithms for future work.
We provide the following results:
• In Section 3, we present an algorithm parametrized by λ, which achieves distortion O(n1/(λ+1)) by
makingO(λ log n) queries per agent. In particular, by seing λ = O(1) and λ = O(log n) we achieve
respectively
– distortionO(
√
n) using O(log n) queries per agent;
– constant distortion using O(log2 n) queries per agent.
e algorithm is inspired by a conceptually similar idea presented by Amanatidis et al. [2020] for the
social choice seing. In Section 6 we adapt our algorithm to provide analogous information-distortion
tradeoffs for a wide range of well-studied optimization problems, including two-sided matching, general
graph matching and the clearing problem for kidney exchange.
• Next, still in Section 3, motivated by the analysis of the class of algorithms mentioned above as well as
our lower bounds in Section 4, we consider a class of instances (coined k-well-structured instances) that
captures the case where the agents (roughly) agree on the ranking of the items. We present a simple
algorithm achieving distortion O(k · n1/k) by making only k queries per agent for these instances.
• In Section 4 we show a lower bound of Ω(n1/k/k) on the distortion of any algorithm that makes k
queries per agent. An immediate consequence of this bound is that it is impossible to achieve constant
distortion without asking almost log n queries! When k is a constant, our aforementioned results
on k-well-structured instances also establish the tightness of our construction, since the proof uses
instances of this type. Furthermore, using a construction which exploits the same ordinal but different
cardinal information, we show that even under the stronger assumption of unit-sum normalization, the
distortion cannot be beer than Ω
(
n1/(k+1)/k
)
with k queries per agent.
• In Section 5 we present our main algorithmic result for unit-sum valuations, namely a novel algorithm
which achieves distortionO(n2/3
√
log n) using only two queries per agent.
Our results are summarized in Figure 1. We note that our upper bounds are robust to “errors” in the
responses to the queries (albeit not stated this way for the sake of simplicity). As long as the reported
values are within a constant multiplicative factor from the true values, qualitatively there is no change in
any of our bounds.
Technical Overview
Our parametrized class of algorithms developed in Section 3 is based on the following idea. First, every
agent is queried for their favorite item. en, for each agent, the algorithm partitions the items into sets
so that the value of the agent for all items in a set is lower-bounded by a carefully defined quantity; these
sets are constructed via a sequence of binary search subroutines. Finally, the algorithm outputs a matching
that maximizes the social welfare, with respect to the “simulated” values obtained via this process.
A similar idea was proposed by Amanatidis et al. [2020] for the social choice seing. We remark,
however, that if one translates their result directly to our seing (by interpreting matchings as alternatives
and running their algorithm), it yields inconsequential distortion bounds, as well as an exponential-time
running time for the algorithm. To obtain meaningful bounds, the key is to adopt the principle of their
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Figure 1: An overview of our results. Some of the distortion guarantees hold for k-well-structured in-
stances; this is indicated in brackets next to the bound. e upper bounds that hold for unrestricted valu-
ations also obviously hold for unit-sum valuations. All of the lower bounds hold even for instances with
the same ordinal preferences for all agents.
approach rather than the exact solution proposed. As a maer of fact, in Section 6, we show that the same
principle can be further refined and applied to a plethora of other combinatorial optimization problems on
graphs with additive objectives. In particular, we show bounds of similar flavor for several well-studied
problems, such as
• two-sided (perfect) matching (i.e., a (perfect) matching on a bipartite graph with agents on each side);
• general graph matching (i.e., a matching on a general graph with agents being the vertices);
• general resource allocation (i.e., the allocation ofm items to n agents under various constraints);
• max k-sum clustering (i.e., a generalizationofmatchings on graphs, see [Anshelevich and Sekar, 2016a]);
• the clearing problem for kidney exchanges (i.e., a cycle cover with restricted cycle length, see [Abraham
et al., 2007]).
With regard to our results for k-well-structured instances in Section 3, we note that we obtain a notable
improvement over the tradeoffs achieved by the aforementioned approach. For instance, a distortion of
O(
√
n) is achievable here using only two queries! To provide some intuition, one can think of k-well-
structured instances as capturing cases for which there is a general agreement on the set of the “most
valuable items”, although the agents might rank the items in this set in different ways. For example, most
researchers in Artificial Intelligence would agree on the top 5 publication venues, although they might
rank those 5 venues differently. e parameter k captures the different “levels” of agreement.
An interesting class of instances that are k-well-structured for every k is that of instances where all
the agents have the same ranking over all items. ese instances are important because intuitively, they
highlight the challenge of social welfare maximization under ordinal information. How is an algorithm in
that case supposed to distinguish between pairs of high and low value? Perhaps somewhat surprisingly,
it turns out that such instances are more amenable to handling via a smaller number of queries. In fact,
the related literature has been concerned in the past with this type of instances; e.g., Filos-Ratsikas et al.
[2014] used such instances in their lower bound constructions and referred to them as ordered instances,
and Plaut and Roughgarden [2020] and Barman andKrishnamurthy [2020] considered such instances in the
context of fair division of indivisible items. We also use such instances for our lower bound constructions
in Section 4; in that sense, we do not only provide improved upper bounds for an interesting class of
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instances but we also show the tightness of the analysis for our lower bound constructions.
We remark that the results of Section 3 and Section 6 do not require any normalization assumptions.
For agents with unit-sum normalized valuations, in Section 5, we present an algorithm which achieves
a distortion of O(n2/3
√
log n) using only two queries per agent. e algorithm is adaptive, and uses the
second query differently, depending on the maximum value that it sees aer querying all agents at the first
position. While this result is not tight based on our lower bound of Ω(n1/3) for this case, we consider it
as one of the highlights of this work. In particular, it shows that sublinear distortion is possible even with
a deterministic algorithm using a constant number of queries per agent.
1.2 Related Work
e one-sided matching problem in the context of agents with preferences over items was firstly intro-
duced by Hylland and Zeckhauser [1979]. e classic literature in economics (e.g., see [Bogomolnaia and
Moulin, 2001, Svensson, 1999] and references therein) was mostly concerned with axiomatic properties,
and has proposed several solutions and impossibilities; see the surveys of So¨nmez and U¨nver [2011] and
Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [2013] for more information.
e effects of limited information on the social welfare objectivewere studiedmost notably in the work
of Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2014] mentioned earlier. Further, a line of work [Anshelevich and Sekar, 2016a,b,
Anshelevich and Zhu, 2017, Abramowitz and Anshelevich, 2018] studied related seings on graphs, and
showed distortion bounds for matching problems and their generalizations. A crucial difference from our
work is that they consider symmetric weights on the edges of the graph, which corresponds to cases where
agents are paired with other agents (e.g., matching or clustering) and the value of an agent i for another
agent j is the same as the value of j for i. In contrast, in the graph problems that we consider, the weights
are assumed to be asymmetric; the weight of an edge is given by the sum of weights of incident vertices.2
is makes the results markedly different. Another important distinction is that most of the aforemen-
tioned works operate in the seing where the edge weights satisfy the triangle inequality, whereas we
impose no such restriction. Caragiannis et al. [2016] study one-side matching seings in metric spaces,
and thus their work also falls into this category, but is quite distinct as they focus on cost objectives rather
than welfare.
For general social choice seings (i.e., voting), the distortion of ordinal algorithms has been studied in
a long list of papers, e.g., see [Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006, Anshelevich and Postl, 2017, Anshelevich
et al., 2018, Boutilier et al., 2015, Caragiannis et al., 2017, Benade et al., 2017, Caragiannis et al., 2018, Fain
et al., 2019, Filos-Ratsikas and Miltersen, 2014, Goel et al., 2017, Munagala and Wang, 2019, Feldman et al.,
2016, Gkatzelis et al., 2020]. Most of the related work considers the standard case where only ordinal
information is given, with a few notable exceptions [Abramowitz et al., 2019, Benade et al., 2017, Bhaskar
et al., 2018, Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2020, Filos-Ratsikas and Voudouris, 2020].
e approach of enhancing the expressiveness of algorithms by equipping them with cardinal queries
that we adopt in this paper was first suggested by Amanatidis et al. [2020]. It should be noted that this is in
nature quite different from another related recent approach proposed by Mandal et al. [2019, 2020], which
considers the communication complexity of voting algorithms. In that seing, the algorithm must elicit a
limited number of bits of information from the agents and it is not assumed that the ordinal preferences
are already known. Moreover, the agents are allowed within that number of bits to communicate partial
information about all of their different values.
2 Anshelevich et al. [2013] refer to this seing as “Asymmetric Edge-Labeled Graphs” as opposed to “Symmetric Edge-Labeled
Graphs”, which is the seing of [Anshelevich and Sekar, 2016a] and the other works mentioned above.
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2 Model definition
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where there is a set of agents N and a set of items A, such
that |N | = |A| = n. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : A→ R≥0 indicating the agent’s value
for each item; that is vi(j) is the value of agent i ∈ N for item j ∈ A. e valuation functions we consider
are either
• unrestricted, in which case the values for the items can be any non-negative real numbers, or
• unit-sum, in which case the sum of values of each agent i for all items is 1:
∑
j∈A vi(j) = 1.
We denote by v = (vi)i∈N the (cardinal) valuation profile of the agents. Let Y = (yi)i∈N be a matching
according to which each agent i ∈ N is matched to exactly one item yi ∈ A, such that yi 6= yi′ for every
i 6= i′. Given a profile v, the social welfare of Y , SW(Y |v), is the total value of the agents for the items
they are matched to according to Y :
SW(Y |v) =
∑
i∈N
vi(yi) .
By M we denote the set of all perfect matchings on our instance. Our goal is to compute a matching
X(v) = (xi)i∈N with maximum social welfare, i.e.,
X(v) ∈ arg max
Y ∈M
SW(Y |v) .
In case the valuation functions of the agents are known, then computingX(v) can be done efficiently,
e.g., via the Hungarian method [Kuhn, 1956]. However, our seing is a bit more restrictive. e exact
valuation functions of the agents are their private information, and they can instead report orderings over
the items, which are consistent with their valuations. In particular, every agent i reports a ranking of the
items ≻i such that a ≻i b if and only if vi(a) ≥ vi(b) for all a, b ∈ A. Given a valuation profile v, we
denote by ≻v= (≻i)i∈N the ordinal profile induced by v; observe that different valuation profiles may
induce the same ordinal profile. On top of the ordinal preferences of the agents, we can obtain partial
access to the valuation profile, by making a number of value queries per agent. In particular, a value query
takes as input an agent i ∈ N and an item j ∈ A, and returns the value vi(j) of agent i for item j. is
leads us to the following definition of a deterministic algorithm in our seing.
Definition 1. A matching algorithm Ak takes as input an ordinal profile (≻)i∈N , makes k ≤ n value
queries per agent and, using (≻)i∈N as well as the answers to the queries, it computes a matching Ak(≻
) ∈M. If k = 0, A is an ordinal algorithm, whereas if k = n, A is a cardinal algorithm.
As already mentioned, we can efficiently compute the optimal matching using a cardinal algorithm.
However, if an algorithm is allowed to make a limited number k < n of queries per agent, the computed
matching might not be optimal. e question then is how well does such an algorithm approximate the
optimal social welfare of any matching. Approximation here is captured by the notion of distortion.
Definition 2. e distortion dist(Ak) of an algorithmAk is the worst-case ratio (over all possible valuation
profiles v) between the social welfare of an optimal matchingX(v) and the social welfare of the matching
computed by Ak:
dist(Ak) = sup
v
SW(X(v)|v)
SW(Ak(≻v)|v) .
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2.1 Warm-up: Ordinal Algorithms
Before we proceed with our more technical results on tradeoffs between information and distortion, we
consider the case of ordinal algorithms. When the valuation functions of the agents are unrestricted, the
distortion of any ordinal algorithm is unbounded. To see this, consider any instance that contains two
agents who agree on which the most valuable item is. Since only one of them can be matched to this
item, it might be the case that the other agent has an arbitrarily large value for it, leading to unbounded
distortion. Even for the more restrictive case of unit-sum valuations, however, the distortion of ordinal
algorithms can be quite large.
eorem 1. e distortion of the best ordinal matching algorithm is Θ(n2).
Proof. For the upper bound, consider any algorithm that outputs a matching so that some agent is matched
to her top-ranked item. As the valuations are unit-sum, this agentmust have value at least 1/n for this item,
and thus the social welfare of the matching computed by the algorithm is in turn also at least 1/n. Since
the value of every agent for any item is at most 1, the maximum possible social welfare is upper-bounded
by n, and thus the distortion of the algorithm is at most n2.
For the lower bound, we assume that n is even; our instance can be easily adjusted for odd n. We
consider an instance with set of items A = {a, b1, . . . , bn/2, c1, . . . , cn/2−1}. e ordinal profile is such
that, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}, agents i and i+ n/2 have the same ordinal preference ≻i, defined as
a ≻i bi ≻i b1 ≻i . . . ≻i bi−1 ≻i bi+1 ≻i . . . ≻i bn/2 ≻i c1 ≻i . . . ≻i cn/2−1 .
Consider any ordinal algorithmwhich, given as input this profile, outputs a matchingY = (yi)i∈N . We de-
fine a valuation profile v which is consistent with the ordinal profile, and the value of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
depends on the structure of Y . For convenience, let si denote the second favorite itemof agent i, i.e., si = bi
if i ≤ n/2 and si = bi−n/2 if i > n/2.
• If yi = a, then agent i has value 1/n for all items;
• If yi = si, then agent i has value 1 for a and 0 for every other item;
• Otherwise, agent i has value 1/2 for a, 1/2 for si and 0 for every other item.
Since only one agent can be matched to a, and everyone else will be matched to an item of value 0, the
social welfare of Y computed by the algorithm is SW(Y |v) = 1/n. However, observe that there exists a
matchingX with social welfare SW(X|v) ≈ n/4. In particular, we can go through the agents and match
each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} to si if she is not already matched to si or to a in Y . is way we will end up
with a matching where at least n/2− 1 agents will have value 1/2 each for the corresponding items. Our
claim about the social welfare follows. erefore, the distortion of any ordinal algorithm is Ω(n2).
3 Distortion Guarantees for Unconstrained Valuations
Here we present λ-ThresholdStepFunction (λ-TSF), an algorithm that works for any valuation func-
tions. At a high level, for each agent, we do the following. We first query the agent’s value for her highest
ranked item. en, we partition the items into λ+1 sets, so that the agent’s value for all the items in a set
is lower-bounded by a carefully selected quantity related to the agent’s top value. Based on this partition,
we then define a new simulated valuation function for the agent, where the value of an item is equal to
the lower bound that corresponds to the set the item belongs to. Finally, we compute a maximum weight
matching with respect to the simulated valuation functions. Formally:
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λ-ThresholdStepFunction (λ-TSF)
Let αℓ = n
−ℓ/(λ+1) for ℓ ∈ {0, ..., λ}.
For every agent i ∈ N :
• ery i for her top-ranked item j∗i ; let v
∗
i be this value.
• Let Qi,0 = {j∗i } and v˜i(j∗i ) = α0 · v∗i = v∗i .
• For every ℓ ∈ {1, ..., λ}, using binary search, compute
Qi,ℓ = {j ∈ A : vi(j) ∈ [αℓ · v∗i , αℓ−1 · v∗i )}
and let v˜i(j) = αℓ · v∗i for every j ∈ Qi,ℓ.
• Let Qi =
⋃λ
ℓ=0Qi,ℓ and set v˜i(j) = 0 for j ∈ A \Qi.
Return a matching Y ∈ argmaxZ∈M SW(Z|v˜).
e next theorem follows (asymptotically) from the more general eorem 9, which is stated in Sec-
tion 6 and applies to a number of well-known graph problems. To aid the reader, we also include a self-
contained, cleaner proof ofeorem 2 which applies only to one-sidedmatching and gives a slightly beer
bound.
eorem 2. λ-TSF makes 1 + λ+ λ log n queries per agent and achieves a distortion of 2n1/(λ+1).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary valuation profile v. Let X = X(v) be an optimal matching, and Y be the
solution returned by λ-TSF; recall that Y maximizes the social welfare according to the simulated valuation
functions v˜i. Let S be the set of agents i such that xi ∈ Qi, and S = N \S. en, the optimal social welfare
can be wrien as
SW(X|v) =
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) =
∑
i∈S
vi(xi) +
∑
i∈S
vi(xi).
We will bound the two terms separately. We begin with the first one:∑
i∈S
vi(xi) < αλ
∑
i∈S
v∗i ≤ αλ · n ·max
i∈N
v∗i ≤ αλ · n · SW(Y |v˜) ≤ αλ · n · SW(Y |v).
efirst inequality follows directly by the definition ofQi. e second inequality follows sinceS ⊆ N . e
third inequality follows since Y maximizes the social welfare according to the profile v and the algorithm
has queried all agents for their most-preferred items. Finally, the last inequality follows since the simulated
values of an agents are lower bounds on her true ones.
For the second term, let Sℓ be the restriction of S on agents for whom xi ∈ Qi,ℓ, ℓ ∈ {0, ..., λ}. en,
∑
i∈S
vi(xi) =
λ∑
ℓ=0
∑
i∈Sℓ
vi(xi) .
Now, let us assume that λ > 0; we will deal with the simpler case where λ = 0 later. By definition, for
any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , λ} and any j ∈ Qi,ℓ, we have that vi(j) ≤ αℓ−1 · v∗i = αℓ−1αℓ ·αℓ · v∗i = v˜i(j)/α1 . Also, for
8
Qi,0 = {j∗i }, we have vi(j∗i ) = v˜i(j∗i ) ≤ v˜i(j∗i )/α1. Hence,
∑
i∈S
vi(xi) ≤ α−11
λ∑
ℓ=0
∑
i∈Sℓ
v˜i(xi) ≤ α−11
∑
i∈N
v˜i(xi) ≤ α−11 SW(Y |v˜) ≤ α−11 SW(Y |v) .
e second inequality follows by considering all agents. e third inequality follows from the optimality
of Y with respect to the simulated valuation functions. Finally, the last inequality follows follows since
the simulated values of an agents are lower bounds on her true ones.
Now we can put everything together:
SW(X|v) ≤ (αλ · n+ α−11 ) SW(Y |v) = 2n1/(λ+1) · SW(Y |v) , (1)
and this seles the bound on the distortion when λ > 0.
When λ = 0, we clearly have that∑
i∈S
vi(xi) ≤
∑
i∈S
v˜i(xi) ≤ SW(Y |v) .
en, the analog of (1) is
SW(X|v) ≤ (αλ · n+ 1) SW(Y |v) = 2n1/(λ+1) · SW(Y |v) .
is concludes the proof.
By appropriately seing the value of λ, we obtain several tradeoffs between the distortion and the
number of queries per agent. In particular, we have the following statement.
Corollary 1. We can achieve
• distortion O(n) by making one query per agent;
• distortion O(n1/k) for any constant integer k by making O(log n) queries per agent;
• distortion O(1) by making O(log2 n) queries per agent.
3.1 Well-structured instances
We now consider instances in which the agents exhibit quite similar ordinal preferences. For any positive
integer k, we define the class of k-well-structured (k-WS) instances. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be a constant (e.g.,
ε = 1/2). In a k-WS instance, the set of items can be partitioned into k+1 setsA1, . . . , Ak ,Ak+1 such that
|A1| = 1 and |Aℓ| = ε · n(ℓ−1)/k for all ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , k} ,
and every agent i has the ordinal preference
〈A1〉i ≻i 〈A2〉i ≻i . . . ≻i 〈Ak〉i ≻i 〈Ak+1〉i ,
where 〈Aℓ〉i denotes some ordering of the items in set Aℓ which depends on agent i; that is, different
agents may order the items in Aℓ differently. Observe that an instance in which all agents have the same
ranking over the items is a k-WS instance for every k. We will use such instances in our lower bounds in
the next section.
For the class of k-WS instanceswe present a simple algorithm, names k-FixedMaxMatching (k-FMM),
which achieves a distortion of O(k · n1/k) by making k queries per agent. It works as follows:
9
k-FixedMaxMatching (k-FMM)
For every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, query the value of each agent i for her least-preferred item inAℓ; denote
this value by ui(ℓ).
For each i ∈ N , define the simulated valuation function v˜i:
• v˜i(j) = ui(ℓ) for every j ∈ Aℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k};
• v˜i(j) = 0 for every j ∈ Ak+1.
Return a matching Y ∈ argmaxZ SW(Z|v˜).
eorem 3. For the class of k-well-structured instances with k ≥ 1, k-FMM makes k queries per agent and
achieves a distortion of O(k · n1/k).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary k-WS instance with valuation profile v. For ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, denote by Sℓ
the set of |Aℓ| = n(ℓ−1)/k agents with the highest values for the last item in Aℓ (breaking ties arbitrarily).
Since there exists a matching of the items inAℓ to the agents of Sℓ, the algorithm maximizes the simulated
welfare, and vi(j) ≥ v˜i(j) for every agent i and item j, the social welfare of the matching Y computed by
the algorithm is
SW(Y |v) ≥
∑
i∈Sℓ
ui(ℓ)
≥ n(ℓ−1)/k ·min
i∈Sℓ
ui(ℓ) ,
for every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Observe that since A1 consists of just one item, the inequality for ℓ = 1 can be
simplified to
SW(Y |v) ≥ max
i
ui(1) .
Now, letX be an optimal matching, and denote by xj the agent matched to item j ∈ A. en,
SW(X|v) =
k+1∑
ℓ=1
∑
j∈Aℓ
vxj(j) =
∑
j∈A1
vxj(j) +
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
vxj (j)
≤ max
i
ui(1) +
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
uxj (ℓ− 1) ,
where the inequality follows sinceA1 consists of just one item, and the values of the agents for every item
in Aℓ are at most their values for the last item in Aℓ−1 (since all items in Aℓ−1 are ranked higher than the
items in Aℓ). Let us focus on the right-most term of the above expression. We have
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
uxj(ℓ− 1) =
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
∑
xj∈Sℓ−1
uxj(ℓ− 1) +
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
∑
xj 6∈Sℓ−1
uxj (ℓ− 1) .
By the definition of Sℓ−1, for every agent i 6∈ Sℓ−1, it holds that uxj(ℓ − 1) ≤ mini∈Sℓ−1 ui(ℓ − 1), and
thus
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
uxj (ℓ− 1) ≤
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
∑
xj∈Sℓ−1
uxj(ℓ− 1) +
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
∑
xj 6∈Sℓ−1
min
i∈Sℓ−1
ui(ℓ− 1) .
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Observe that the internal double sum of the first term can sum over at most all agents in Sℓ−1, while the
internal double sum of the second term can sum over at most |Aℓ| agents. Using the fact that |Ak+1| ≤ n
and the lower bounds for the social welfare of the matching computed by the algorithm, we obtain
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
j∈Aℓ
uxj(ℓ− 1) ≤
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
i∈Sℓ−1
ui(ℓ− 1) +
k+1∑
ℓ=2
|Aℓ| min
i∈Sℓ−1
ui(ℓ− 1)
=
k+1∑
ℓ=2
∑
i∈Sℓ−1
ui(ℓ− 1) +
k∑
ℓ=2
n(ℓ−1)/k · min
i∈Sℓ−1
ui(ℓ− 1) + |Ak+1|min
i∈Sk
ui(k)
≤
k∑
ℓ=1
∑
i∈Sℓ
ui(ℓ) + n
1/k
k−1∑
ℓ=1
n(ℓ−1)/k ·min
i∈Sℓ
ui(ℓ) + n ·min
i∈Sk
ui(k)
≤ (k + k · n1/k) · SW(Y |v) .
Puing everything together, we obtain the theorem.
We conclude our discussion on k-WS instances with a lower bound Ω(n1/k) on the distortion of the
(k− 1)-TSF algorithm; here, the value of the parameter λ is chosen to be k− 1 because of the structure of
k-WS instances. Combined together with the O(k log n) queries that it requires to operate, we have that
when k is sub-logarithmic, the k-FMM algorithm presented above matches the distortion of (k − 1)-TSF
on k-WS instances, using a factor of log n less queries per agent.
eorem 4. For every constant k ≥ 1, there exists a k-well-structured instance such that the distortion of
(k − 1)-TSF when given this instance as input is Ω(n1/k).
Proof. Consider an instance in which all agents have the same ordinal preference over the items, which
can be easily seen to be a k-WS instance for every k ≥ 1. Let us now define the cardinal values which are
revealed when the (k − 1)-TSF algorithm queries the agents:
• αℓ−1 = n
−(ℓ−1)/k for queries about items in Aℓ, ℓ ≤ k;
• 0 for queries about items in Ak+1.
Because the rankings of the agents for the items and the revealed information due to the queries of the algo-
rithm are the same among the agents, the algorithm will define the same simulated valuation function for
all agents. In particular, based on the revealed values, we have that Qi,ℓ−1 = Aℓ for every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
By considering a valuation profile v according to which an agent that is matched to an item in set Aℓ has
value αℓ−1 for it, we have that the social welfare of the matching Y computed by the algorithm is
SW(Y |v) =
k∑
ℓ=1
|Aℓ| · αℓ−1 = 1 + ε
k∑
ℓ=2
n(ℓ−1)/k · n−(ℓ−1)/k = 1 + ε · (k − 1) ≤ k .
Now, observe that when binary search is restricted to run over only the items in the setAℓ, ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , k+
1}, it does not query all the items inAℓ; in particular, because of the way binary search operates, the value
of the first |Aℓ|/2 items therein will never be revealed. Hence, even if the algorithm matches the agents
to items for which they have not been queried for, there must exist a matching X such that for every
ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , k+1} the first |Aℓ|/2 items ofAℓ are matched to agents different than the ones chosen by the
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algorithm, who have not been queried for their values. By seing the real values of the agents for these
items to be αℓ−2, and observing that |Ak+1| = ξn for some constant ξ ∈ (0, 1), we have
SW(X|v) ≥
k+1∑
ℓ=2
|Aℓ|
2
· αℓ−2 = ε
2
k∑
ℓ=2
n(ℓ−1)/k · n−(ℓ−2)/k + ξ
2
· n · n−(k−1)/k ≥ min{ε, ξ}
2
· k · n1/k.
Hence, the distortion is Ω(n1/k).
4 Lower bounds
In this section we show unconditional lower bounds for algorithms for one-sided matching which are
allowed to make at most k ≥ 1 queries per agent. We present a generic matching instance which can be
fine-tuned to yield lower bounds for both unrestricted and unit-sum valuation functions. Let V denote any
of these two classes of valuation functions.
Let δV(k) ≤ 1/k be a function of k, and ε ∈ (0, 1/2) be some constant. We want to define an instance
in which the n items are partitioned into k + 2 sets A1, ..., Ak+1, B = A \
(⋃
ℓ∈[k+1]Aℓ
)
such that
|Aℓ| = ε · n(ℓ−1)δV (k).
Note that because we have restricted the possible values of δV(k) to be at most 1/k and have chosen ε < 1,
these sets of items can be defined; in particular, |Ak+1| ≤ εn. We assume that n is large enough so that
n > 2
∑k+1
ℓ=1 |Aℓ| and that is such that the cardinalities are indeed integers; the laer is only assumed to
simplify the notation. We use 〈T 〉 to denote some fixed arbitrary ranking of the elements of set T (which
is common for all agents). Given that, we define the ordinal preference of every agent i ∈ N to be
〈A1〉 ≻i 〈A2〉 ≻i ... ≻i 〈Ak〉 ≻i 〈Ak+1〉 ≻i 〈B〉.
We reveal the following information, depending on the queries of the algorithm:
• For every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, any query for some item in Aℓ reveals a value of |Aℓ|−1 · n−δV(k);
• Every query for some item in B reveals a value of 0.
Observe that for δV(k) = 1/k, we have actually defined a k-well-structured instance in which all agents
have the same ordinal preference. As we will see below, this choice of δV in fact yields the best lower
bound if V is the class of unrestricted valuations. However, when V is the class of unit-sum valuations, we
will have to choose δV differently.
Next, we define two types of conditional valuation functions that an agent i may have, depending on
the behavior of the algorithm. ese functions have to be consistent to the information that is revealed by
the queries of the algorithm. Let ξ ∈ (0, 1] be some constant.
(T1) If there exists r ∈ {1, . . . , k+1}, such that i is not queried for any item in Ar and she does not get an
item from Ar either, then i’s values are
• at least ξ · |Ar−1|−1 · n−δV(k) for each item in Ar if r ≥ 2;
• at least ξ for the item in A1 if r = 1;
• |Aℓ|−1 · n−δV(k) for every item in Aℓ, for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} \ {r};
• 0 for every item in B.
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(T2) If i is queried for some item in k different sets out of A1, . . . , Ak+1, then her values are
• |Aℓ|−1 · n−δV(k) for every item in Aℓ, for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1};
• at most |Ak+1|−1 · n−δV(k) for every item in B.
Observe that the conditions specified in (T1) and (T2) capture all possible cases about the queries of the
algorithm and the possible assignments of the items to the agents.
eorem 5. Let V be the class of unrestricted or unit-sum valuation functions. If there exists a function
δV(k) ≤ 1/k such that it is possible to define valuation functions in V of types (T1) and (T2), the distortion
of any matching algorithm which makes k queries per agent is Ω
(
1
k · nδV(k)
)
.
Proof. Observe that if the values of the agents for all items in a setAℓ are consistent to the revealed values,
then the total value for all items in set Aℓ is equal to |Aℓ| · |Aℓ|−1 · n−δV(k) = n−δV(k). Since there are
valuation functions of types (T1) and (T2), we can indeed define a valuation profile v so that the value of
every agent for the item she is matched to by the algorithm is exactly the value she would reveal if she was
queried for it. So, the items of every set Aℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, contribute exactly n−δV(k) to the social
welfare of the matching Y computed by the algorithm, while the items in B contribute 0. Hence,
SW(Y |v) = (k + 1) · n−δV(k).
Hence, to show the desired bound on the distortion of the algorithm, it suffices to show that there is always
a matching with social welfare Ω(1).
is is clearly the case when there exists an agent who is not queried for the item in A1 and is not
given this item, since her value for it in such a case can be set to be at least ξ using a function of type (T1)
for r = 1. erefore, since this item can only be given to one agent, in the following we assume that there
is at most one agent who is not queried for it, and if such an agent exists, she must be given the item.
Consider the set S2 of agents who are not queried for any item inA2 and also do not get any item inA2.
If |S2| ≥ |A2|, then by defining the valuation function of every agent in S2 to be of type (T1) for r = 2, we
can obtain a matching (in which exactly |A2| agents in S2 are given a different item from A2) with social
welfare at least |A2| ·ξ · |A1|−1 ·n−δV (k) = ξ. e laer follows by the fact that |At| · |At−1|−1 = nδV (k) for
all t ≥ 2. Consequently, it must be |S2| < |A2|. is further implies that there are at least n − 1− 2|A2|
agents who are queried for some item in each of A1 and A2, and do not get any item in A1 ∪ A2. Let L2
be the set of these agents.
Consider the set S3 ⊆ L2 of agents who are not queried for any item in A3 and also do not get any
item in A3. Like in the case of A3 and S3 above, if |S3| ≥ |A3|, then by defining the valuation function
of every agent in S3 to be of type (T1) for r = 3, we can obtain a matching (in which |A3| of the agents
in S3 are given a different item from A3) with social welfare at least |A3| · ξ · |A2|−1 · n−δV(k) = ξ. So, it
must be |S3| < |A3|, which implies that there are |L2| − |A3| − |S3| ≥ |L2| − 2|A3| agents in L2 who are
queried for some item in each of A1, A2 and A3, and do not get any item in A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3. Let L3 be the
set of these agents.
By induction, this process leads to the existence of the set Lk of agents who have been queried for
some item in each of A1, . . . , Ak , such that |Lk| ≥ n− 1− 2
∑k
ℓ=1 |Aℓ|. Since
n > 2
k+1∑
ℓ=1
|Aℓ| ⇒ n− 1− 2
k∑
ℓ=1
|Aℓ| − |Ak+1| ≥ |Ak+1| ,
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there are |Ak+1| agents who have not been queried for any item inAk+1 and do not get any item inAk+1.
us, by seing their valuation functions to be of type (T1) for r = k + 1, we can construct a matching
with welfare at least ξ, completing the proof.
eorem 5 is actually quite powerful and allows us to prove lower bounds for both unrestricted and
unit-sum valuation functions. In particular, it reduces the problem to finding the largest possible δV(k) ≤
1/k, such that valuation functions in V of types (T1) and (T2) can be defined.
eorem 6. For unconstrained valuation functions, the distortion of any matching algorithm which makes
k queries per agent is Ω
(
1
k · n1/k
)
.
Proof. It is straightforward to observe that it is indeed possible to define unconstrained valuation functions
of types (T1) and (T2) for the function δ∞(k) = 1/k. In particular, the valuation functions are such that
u1(j) =


n−(r−1)/k, if j ∈ Ar
n−ℓ/k, if j ∈ Aℓ, ℓ 6= r
0, if j ∈ B
and
u2(j) =
{
n−ℓ/k, if j ∈ Aℓ
0, if j ∈ B
where ℓ is a generic index, while r in the definition of u1 is an index that corresponds to a setAr such that
i is not queried for any item in it and she does not get an item from it either.
Hence, by eorem 5, any matching algorithm has distortion Ω
(
1
k · n1/k
)
.
For unit-sum valuations, we have the following bound.
eorem 7. Let ξ ∈ (0, 1) be a constant. For unit-sum valuation functions, the distortion of any matching
algorithm which makes k ≤ (1− ξ)n1/(k+1) queries per agent is Ω( 1k · n1/(k+1)).
Proof. Let ε ∈ (0, 1/2) be the constant used for defining the sets A1, . . . , Ak+1. We will show that for
δ1(k) = 1/(k + 1), the following two valuation functions satisfy the unit-sum normalization and are of
types (T1) and (T2), respectively. en, the statement will follow by eorem 5 by substituting δ1(k). e
functions are defined as
u1(j) =


1−k·n−1/(k+1)
εn(r−1)/(k+1)
, if j ∈ Ar
ε−1n−ℓ/(k+1), if j ∈ Aℓ, ℓ 6= r
0, if j ∈ B
and
u2(j) =
{
ε−1n−ℓ/(k+1), if j ∈ Aℓ
1−(k+1)·n−1/(k+1)
|B| , if j ∈ B
where ℓ is a generic index, while r in the definition of u1 is an index that corresponds to a setAr such that
i is not queried for any item in it and she does not get an item from it either.
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First, let us verify that both functions satisfy the unit-sum assumption. By the definition of δ1(k), we
have that |Aℓ| = εn(ℓ−1)/(k+1) for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}. erefore,
∑
j∈A
u1(j) = |Ar| · 1− k · n
−1/(k+1)
εn(r−1)/(k+1)
+
k+1∑
ℓ=1
|Aℓ| · ε−1n−ℓ/(k+1) − |Ar| · ε−1n−r/(k+1)
= 1− k · n−1/(k+1) + k · n−1/(k+1) = 1,
and
∑
j∈A
u2(j) =
k+1∑
ℓ=1
|Aℓ| · ε−1n−ℓ/(k+1) + |B| · 1− (k + 1) · n
1/(k+1)
|B|
= (k + 1) · n−1/(k+1) + 1− (k + 1) · n1/(k+1) = 1.
Next, we will show that u1 is of type (T1). It suffices to show that the values satisfy the corresponding
conditions. We have
• For every item j ∈ Ar , if r ≥ 2:
u1(j) =
1− k · n−1/(k+1)
εn(r−1)/(k+1)
= ε−1
(
n−(r−1)/(k+1) − k · n−r/(k+1))
≥ ε−1 · ξ · n−(r−1)/(k+1) = ε−1 · ξ · n−(r−2)/(k+1) · n−1/(k+1) = ξ · |Ar−1|−1 · n−δ1(k).
• For the item j ∈ A1: u1(j) = ε−1
(
1− k · n−1/(k+1)) ≥ ε−1ξ ≥ ξ.
• For every item j ∈ Aℓ, ℓ 6= r:
u1(j) = ε
−1n−ℓ/(k+1) = ε−1n−(ℓ−1)/(k+1) · n−1/(k+1) = |Aℓ|−1 · n−δ1(k).
• For every item j ∈ B: u1(j) = 0.
Finally, we will show that u2 is of type (T2). Similarly to the above case, we have
• For every item j ∈ Aℓ:
u2(j) = ε
−1n−ℓ/(k+1) = ε−1n−(ℓ−1)/k · n−1/(k+1) = |Aℓ|−1 · n−δ1(k).
• For every item j ∈ B:
u2(j) =
1− (k + 1) · n−1/(k+1)
|B| =
1− (k + 1) · n−1/(k+1)
n−∑k+1ℓ=1 n(ℓ−1)/(k+1)
≤ 1− (k + 1) · n
−1/(k+1)
n− (k + 1)nk/(k+1) = n
−1 = ε · ε−1 · n−k/(k+1) · n−1/(k+1)
= ε · |Ak+1|−1 · n−δ1(k) ≤ |Ak+1|−1 · n−δ1(k) ,
where the first inequality follows by the fact that nx/(k+1) is increasing in x.
By appropriately seing the value of k in eorem 6 and eorem 7, we establish that it is impossible
to achieve constant distortion without an almost logarithmic number of queries.
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Corollary 2. Any matching algorithm allowed to make at most
• a constant number k queries per agent has distortion Ω(n1/k) when the valuation functions are unre-
stricted, and Ω(n1/(k+1)) when they are unit-sum;
• o
( logn
log logn
)
queries per agent has distortion ω(log log n).
5 Twoeries for Unit-sum Valuations
In this section, we present the FirstPositionAdaptive algorithm (FPA), whichmakes at most two queries
per agent and achieves a distortion of O(n2/3
√
log n), when the valuation functions are unit-sum. First,
we query each agent for their most-preferred item. en, depending on whether the maximum revealed
value by these queries is at least n−1/3, we query the agents for items that are parts of “large enough”
partial matchings. Otherwise, we query everyone at a specific position, and define simulated values based
on the answers to these queries, ensuring that these values are lower bounds on the corresponding true
values. Clearly, the simulated valuation functions are not necessarily unit-sum.
For the sake of the presentation, we assume that n is a perfect cube, that is, n = α3 for some α ∈ N;
it is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case where this is not true.
FirstPositionAdaptive (FPA)
All agents are initially active.
For every agent i, query i for her top item j∗i ; let v
∗
i be its value.
Ifmaxi∈N v
∗
i ≥ n−1/3, then:
• For every ℓ ∈ [n], while there exists a partial matching Yp of size |Yp| ≥ n1/3/
√
log n
consisting of active agents i matched to items yi such that agent i ranks item yi at some
position ℓ′ ≤ ℓ, query every i in Yp for item yi and make these agents inactive. If necessary,
break ties arbitrarily.
• Output a matching Y that maximizes the social welfare, according to the revealed values due
to the above queries.
Else (i.e.,maxi∈N v
∗
i < n
−1/3):
• For every agent i, query i for the item she ranks at position n1/3 + 1; let ui be this value.
• For every agent i, define the simulated valuation function v˜i:
– v˜i(ji
∗) = v∗i ;
– v˜i(j) = ui for every item j that i ranks at position ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , n1/3 + 1};
– v˜i(j) = 0 for every item j that i ranks at position ℓ ∈ {n1/3 + 2, . . . , n}.
• For every agent i such that ui <
1
2n
−1, modify v˜i so that:
– v˜i(j) =
1
3n
−1/3 for every item j that i ranks at position ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , 14n1/3}.
• Output a matching Y ∈ argmaxZ SW(Z|v˜).
e distortion of the algorithm is given by the following theorem.
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eorem 8. For unit-sum valuation functions, the distortion of FPA is O(n2/3
√
log n).
Proof. Letv be a valuation profile. Denote by Y the output of the algorithmwhen given as input the ordinal
profile ≻v, and by X = (xi)i∈N an optimal matching for v. We consider two main cases, depending on
the valuemaxi∈N v
∗
i that the algorithm learns with the first query.
Case 1: maxi∈N v
∗
i ≥ n−1/3. e algorithm makes a second query to an agent i for some item j only if
the pair (i, j) is part of a partial matching of size at least n1/3, involving only active agents, i.e., agents
who have not been included in such a partial matching in any previous step. Let Y1, . . . , Yλ be all the
partial matchings considered throughout the execution of the algorithm. By definition, each such partial
matching contains at leastn1/3/
√
log n agents and an agent is contained in at most one of thesematchings.
us, it holds that λ < n2/3
√
log n.
We partition the agents into two sets. e setH of agents i that are queried only for items they rank at
least as high as the item xi they receive in the optimal matchingX . Some agents inH are possibly queried
twice for their best item. e set L of agents i that are queried for an item they rank lower than xi or are
queried only once. We can write the social welfare of X as
SW(X|v) =
∑
i∈H
vi(xi) +
∑
i∈L
vi(xi) .
We will bound each term on the right-hand side separately. For the first term, we have:
∑
i∈H
vi(xi) ≤
∑
i∈H
vi(yi) ≤
λ∑
t=1
∑
i∈Yt
vi(yi) ≤ λmax
t
∑
i∈Yt
vi(yi) < n
2/3
√
log n · SW(Y |v) .
e first inequality holds because yi <i xi for every i ∈ H . e second inequality holds because the
agents in H are queried only if they are included in one of the partial matchings Y1, . . . , Yλ. e last
inequality follows from the bound on λ established above, and the fact thatmaxt
∑
i∈Yt
vi(yi) is trivially
upper bounded by the social welfare of Y .
To bound the second term, let Y (ℓ) be the restriction of Y containing only the agents i ∈ L for whom
xi is at position ℓ. It holds that |Y (ℓ)| < n1/3/
√
log n, or else the algorithm would have queried the agents
in Y (ℓ) for their optimal items, contradicting their membership in L. So, we get that
∑
i∈L
vi(xi) =
n∑
ℓ=1
∑
i∈Y (ℓ)
vi(xi) <
n∑
ℓ=1
n1/3
√
log n
1
ℓ
<
n1/3√
log n
2 log n = 2n1/3
√
log n ,
where the first inequality follows from the unit-sum normalization; in particular, any agent’s value for
an item at position ℓ is at most 1/ℓ. e second inequality is a simple bound on the harmonic numbers:∑n
i=1 i
−1 < 2 log2 n, for n ≥ 2.
Further, sincemaxi∈N v
∗
i ≥ n−1/3, we have that SW(Y |v) ≥ n−1/3. us,∑
i∈L
vi(xi) ≤ 2n2/3
√
log n · SW(Y |v) .
Puing everything together, the distortion of the algorithm in this case is at most 2n2/3
√
log n.
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Case 2: maxi∈N v
∗
i < n
−1/3. We partition the set of agents into two sets, depending on whether their
value for the item they rank at position n1/3 + 1 is at most 12n
−1. In particular, let R = {i ∈ N : ui <
1
2n
−1}. We can write the optimal social welfare ofX as
SW(X|v) =
∑
i∈R
vi(xi) +
∑
i∈N\R
vi(xi) .
We will bound each term separately. For the first term, since maxi∈N v
∗
i < n
−1/3, we clearly have that∑
i∈R
vi(xi) ≤ max
i∈N
v∗i |R| ≤ n−1/3|R| .
Consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ R and denote by ji,ℓ the item she ranks at position ℓ; hence, j∗i = ji,1. We
will first show that vi
(
ji, 1
4
n1/3
) ≥ 13 · n−1/3 = v˜i(ji, 14n1/3). Since ui = vi(ji,n1/3+1) < 12n−1, we have
that
n∑
ℓ=n1/3+1
vi(ji,ℓ) ≤ (n− n1/3 − 1)ui < 1
2
,
and thus, by the unit-sum normalization assumption, we also have that
n1/3∑
ℓ=1
vi(ji,ℓ) ≥ 1
2
.
Since vi(ji,ℓ) ≤ vi(ji,1) < n−1/3 for every ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . , 14n
1/3 − 1} and vi(ji, 1
4
n1/3
) ≥ vi(ji,ℓ) for every
ℓ ∈ {14n1/3, . . . , n1/3}, we obtain
vi
(
ji, 1
4
n1/3
) ≥ 12 −
(
1
4n
1/3 − 1)n−1/3
3
4n
1/3
≥ 1
3
n−1/3 = v˜i
(
ji, 1
4
n1/3
)
.
where the second inequality is a maer of simple calculations. So, all the agents in R have value at least
1
3n
−1/3 for the items they rank at positions up to 14n
1/3. is implies that the simulated valuation functions,
defined by the algorithm, are lower bounds to the real valuation functions.
By Hall’s eorem Hall [1935], it is easy to see that there exists a matching of size min
{|R|, 14n1/3}
where each agent inR is matched to an item she ranks at the first 14n
1/3 positions. Moreover, Y maximizes
the social welfare according to the simulated valuation functions. Hence,
SW(Y |v) ≥ SW(Y |v˜) ≥ 1
3
n−1/3min
{
|R|, 1
4
n1/3
}
.
If |R| < 14n1/3, then SW(Y |v) ≥ 13 |R|n−1/3, and thus∑
i∈R
vi(xi) ≤ 3 · SW(Y |v) .
Otherwise, SW(Y |v) ≥ 1/12, and since |R| ≤ n, we obtain∑
i∈R
vi(xi) ≤ 12n2/3 · SW(Y |v) .
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For the second term, we further partitionN \R into two sets depending on the position of the xis. In
particular, H is the set of agents i ∈ N \ R who rank xi at some position ℓ ≤ n1/3, and L is the set of
remaining agents i ∈ (N \R) \H (who rank xi at some position ℓ > n1/3). Hence,∑
i∈N\R
vi(xi) =
∑
i∈H
vi(xi) +
∑
i∈L
vi(xi) .
First consider the agents inH . Sincemaxi∈N v
∗
i < n
−1/3,∑
i∈H
vi(xi) ≤ max
i∈N
v∗i |H| < n−1/3|H| .
Consider any agent i ∈ H and any item j that i ranks at some position ℓ ≤ n1/3. Since ui is the value of
i for the item she ranks at position n1/3 + 1, we clearly have that vi(j) ≥ ui = v˜i(j) ≥ 12n−1. Note that
there exists a partial matching of size |H| according to which all agents of H are matched to items they
rank at the first n1/3 positions; e.g., the restriction of X on H . Since Y maximizes the social welfare for
the simulated valuation functions, we get
SW(Y |v) ≥ SW(Y |v˜) ≥ 1
2
n−1|H| ,
which immediately implies that ∑
i∈H
vi(xi) ≤ 2n2/3 · SW(Y |v) .
Finally, consider the agents in L, and distinguish the following two cases depending on the size of L.
• |L| ≤ n1/3. Since there are at least n1/3 different items within the first n1/3 positions of each agent in
L, by Hall’s eorem, there exists a matching Y ′ according to which all agents in L receive such an
item, i.e., every i ∈ L has (simulated) value at least ui for the item she gets in Y ′. Combining this with
the optimality of Y for the simulated valuation functions and the fact that the laer lower bound the
real valuation functions, we have
SW(Y |v) ≥ SW(Y |v˜) ≥ SW(Y ′|v˜) ≥
∑
i∈L
ui ≥
∑
i∈L
vi(xi) ,
where the last inequality follows by the definition of L.
• |L| > n1/3. Denote by SL the |SL| = n1/3 agents with the highest values ui among all the agents in
L. We may repeat the above argument for SL instead of L to get SW(Y |v) ≥
∑
i∈SL
ui. en,
SW(Y |v) ≥ n1/3 min
i∈SL
ui ≥ n1/3 max
i∈L\SL
ui .
On the other hand, we have ∑
i∈L
vi(xi) ≤
∑
i∈SL
ui + (|L| − |SL|) max
i∈L\SL
ui
≤
∑
i∈SL
ui + n max
i∈L\SL
ui
≤ (1 + n2/3) · SW(Y |v).
erefore, the distortion of the algorithm is at most 16n2/3 + 1 in case 2. Together with case 1, we obtain
the desired bound of O(n2/3
√
log n).
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6 A General Framework for λ-TSF
In this section we generalize λ-TSF, our algorithm from Section 3, to work for a much broader class of
problems, where we are given the ordinal preferences of the agents and access via queries to their cardinal
values. We begin with the following general full information problem of maximizing an additive objective
over a family of combinatorial structures defined on a weighted graph:
Max-on-Graphs: Given a (directed or undirected) weighted graph G = (U,E,w) and a concise descrip-
tion of the set F ⊆ 2E of feasible solutions, find a solution S ∈ argmaxT∈F
∑
e∈T w(e).
Note that one-sided matching is a special case; G is the complete bipartite graph on N and A, the weight
of an edge {i, j} is vi(j), and F contains the perfect matchings of G.
What we are really interested in is the social choice analog of Max-on-Graphs where the weights
(defined in terms of the valuation functions of the agents) are not given! Instead, we know the ordinal
preferences of each agent/node for other nodes (corresponding to items or other agents).
Ordinal-Max-on-Graphs: Here U = N ∪A, where N is the set of agents and A is the (possibly empty)
set of items; when A 6= ∅, we assume that G is a bipartite graph with independent sets N,A. Although
G = (U,E) is given without the weights, it is assumed that for every i ∈ N there exists a (private)
valuation function vi : U → R≥0, so that
w(e) =


vi(j), if i ∈ N, j ∈ A and e = {i, j} (Bipartite agent–item case)
vi(j) + vj(i), if i, j ∈ N and e = {i, j} (Undirected case)
vi(j), if i, j ∈ N and e = (i, j) (Directed case) .
(2)
We are also given the ordinal profile ≻v= (≻i)i∈N induced by v = (vi)i∈N and a concise description of
the set F ⊆ 2E of feasible solutions. e goal is again to find S ∈ argmaxT∈F
∑
e∈T w(e).
Notice that for Ordinal-Max-on-Graphs to make sense, F should be independent of w. For example, if
only sets ofweight exactlyB are feasible, then it is impossible to find even one feasible set without the exact
cardinal information in our disposal. Still, it is clear that the above algorithmic problem is very general
and captures a huge number of maximization problems on graphs. Of course, not all such problems have
a natural interpretation where the vertices are agents with preferences. Before we state the main result of
this section, we give several examples that have been studied in the computational social choice literature.
General Graph Matching: Given an undirected weighted graph G = (U,E,w), find a matching of
maximum weight, i.e., F contains the matchings of G. In its social choice analog, U = N and w(·) is
defined according to the second branch of (2). A special case of this problem in whichG = (U1∪U2, E,w)
is a bipartite graph, is the celebrated two-sided matching problem [Gale and Shapley, 1962, Roth and
Sotomayor, 1992].
Two-sided Perfect Matching: A variant of two-sided matching, where |U1| = |U2| and only perfect
matchings are feasible.
Max k-Sum Clustering: Given an undirected weighted graph G = (U,E,w), where |U | is a multiple of
k, partition U into k equal-sized clusters in order to maximize the weight of the edges inside the clusters.
at is, F contains, for each partition of U into k equal-sized clusters, the set of edges that do not cross
clusters. is problem generalizes two-sided perfect matching; see [Anshelevich and Sekar, 2016a]. In its
social choice analog, U = N and the weights are defined according to the second branch of (2).
20
General Resource Allocation: Given a bipartite weighted graph G = (U1 ∪ U2, E,w), assign each node
ofU2 to (only) one neighboring node inU1 so that the total value of the corresponding edges is maximized.
ere may be additional combinatorial constraints on this assignment, e.g., no more than βi nodes of U2
may be assigned to node i ∈ U1. at is, F contains the sets of edges that define the partitions of U2 into
|U1| parts that also satisfy the additional constraints. is problem generalizes one-sided matching. In its
social choice analog, U1 = N , U2 = A and w(·) is defined according to the first branch of (2).
Clearing Kidney ℓ-Exchanges: Given a directed weighted graph G = (U,E,w), find a collection of
vertex-disjoint cycles of length at most ℓ so that their total weight is maximized; see [Abraham et al.,
2007]. Here, F contains the edge set of any such collection of short cycles. In its social choice analog,
U = N and w(·) is defined according to the third branch of (2).
We use a variant of λ-TSF, (λ,A)-TSF, that takes as an additional input an approximation algorithmA
for the problem at hand. ere are two main differences from λ-TSF.e simpler one is about the last step;
instead of computing a maximum matching, A is used to compute an (approximately) optimal solution
with respect to the simulated valuation functions. e other difference is more subtle. Now we do not
want to ask each agent i for her top element of U , but rather for her top element that induces an edge
included in some feasible solution. It is not always trivial to find this element for each agent, but oen it
can be done in polynomial time; see Corollary 3 for such examples.
(λ,A)-TSF
Let αℓ = r
−ℓ/(λ+1) for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , λ}, where r = maxT∈F |T |.
For every i ∈ N :
• Find i’s highest-ranked element in U , j∗i , that defines an edge contained in some feasible
solution. at is, j∗i is such that there exist T ∈ F such that {i, j∗i } ∈ T (or (i, j∗i ) ∈ T in
the directed case) and any other element with this property is less preferred for i.
• Learn the value v∗i of i for j
∗
i , and let Qi,0 = {j∗i }, v˜i(j∗i ) = α0 · v∗i = v∗i . (We assume that
when A 6= ∅, vi(j) = 0 for all j ∈ N ).
• For every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, using binary search, compute the set
Qi,ℓ = {j ∈ A : vi(j) ∈ [αℓ · v∗i , αℓ−1 · v∗i )}
and let v˜i(j) = αℓ · v∗i for every j ∈ Qi,ℓ.
• Let Qi =
⋃λ
ℓ=0Qi,ℓ and set v˜i(j) = 0 for every item j ∈ A \Qi.
Using (2) and the simulated valuation functions v˜i, i ∈ N , compute the simulated edge weights
w˜(e), e ∈ E.
ReturnA(G˜), where G˜ = (U,E, w˜).
Note that the step of finding the j∗i s is not given explicitly as it has to be adjusted for the particu-
lar problem at hand. As a concrete non-trivial example, consider the perfect matching variant of general
graph matching, where we only care about perfect matchings. In this case, we can check whether an edge
{i, j} belongs to a perfect matching by removing both i and j and then running the blossom algorithm
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of Edmonds [1965] on the remaining graph (with all weights set to 1). So, by repeatedly using this sub-
routine for an agent i starting from her top element and going down her preference list, we can find j∗i in
polynomial time and then make a query for it.
For the following theorem, we assume that the optimization problem Π is a special case of Max-on-
Graphs withmaxT∈F |T | = r. e parameter r allows for a more refined statement; while for the general
Max-on-Graphs r may be Θ(|U |2), in most cases it is only O(|U |). We further assume that we can ef-
ficiently check whether an edge e belongs to a feasible solution. If not, the distortion guarantee of the
theorem is still true, but there is no guarantee about the running time of (λ,A)-TSF.
eorem 9. Suppose Π is as described above. If A is a (polynomial-time) ρ-approximation algorithm for Π
in the full information seing, then (λ,A)-TSF asks 1 + λ + λ log r queries and achieves distortion at most
3ρ r
1
λ+1 for the social choice analog of Π (in polynomial time).
Proof. Let X ⊆ E be an optimal solution according to the valuation functions vi, and Z be the solu-
tion returned by (λ,A)-TSF. Also, let Y be an optimal solution with respect to the simulated valuation
functions.
In order to unify the notation for the three definitions of edge weights in (1), we write e = 〈i, j〉 to
mean
(i) e = {i, j} with i ∈ N, j ∈ A when A 6= ∅;
(ii) e = {i, j} when A = ∅ and G is undirected;
(iii) e = (i, j) when A = ∅ and G is directed.
Using this notation we can defineXi = {j ∈ U : 〈i, j〉 ∈ X}, for i ∈ N , and write the optimum as∑
e∈X
w(e) =
∑
〈i,j〉∈X
vi(j) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi\Qi
vi(j) +
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi∩Qi
vi(j) .
We will bound the two terms separately. We begin with the first one:∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi\Qi
vi(j) < αλ
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi\Qi
v∗i ≤ αλ
∑
〈i,j〉∈X
v∗i ≤ 2rαλmax
k∈N
v∗k ≤ 2rαλρ
∑
e∈Z
w(e) .
e first inequality follows directly by the definition ofQi. e second inequality follows by extending the
scope of the summation to include all (possibly unordered) pairs in X . For the third inequality, it suffices
to notice that we simultaneously upper bound the number of terms in the summation by 2|X| ≤ 2r and
each v∗i by their maximum. Finally, the last inequality follows by the fact that the optimal value with the
simulated valuation functions is at least maxk∈N v
∗
k and, thus, the solution Z returned by the algorithm
achieves at least a ρ-approximation of that.
For the second term we have
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi∩Qi
vi(j) =
∑
i∈N
k∑
ℓ=0
∑
j∈Xi∩Qi,ℓ
vi(j) .
Now, let us assume that λ > 0; we will deal with the simpler case where λ = 0 later. By definition, for
any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , λ} and any j ∈ Qi,ℓ, we have that vi(j) ≤ αℓ−1 · v∗i = αℓ−1αℓ ·αℓ · v∗i = v˜i(j)/α1 . Also, for
Qi,0 = {j∗i }, we have vi(j∗i ) = v˜i(j∗i ) ≤ v˜i(j∗i )/α1. Hence,
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∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi∩Qi
vi(j) ≤ α−11
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi∩Qi
v˜i(j) = α
−1
1
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi∩Qi
v˜i(j) + α
−1
1
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi\Qi
0
= α−11
∑
〈i,j〉∈X
v˜i(j) = α
−1
1
∑
e∈X
w˜(e) ≤ α−11
∑
e∈Y
w˜(e) ≤ α−11 ρ
∑
e∈Z
w˜(e)
≤ α−11 ρ
∑
e∈Z
w(e) . (3)
e second inequality follows from the optimality of Y with respect to the simulated valuation functions.
e third inequality follows directly from the approximation guarantee ofA: Z aains a ρ approximation
of the value achieved by Y . Finally, the last inequality follows from the fact that v˜i(j) ≤ vi(j) for every
i, j, and thus w˜(e) ≤ w(e) for all e ∈ E.
Now we can put everything together:
∑
e∈X
w(e) ≤ (2rαλρ+ α−11 ρ)∑
e∈Z
w(e) = 3ρr
1
λ+1
∑
e∈Z
w(e) , (4)
and this seles the bound on the distortion of (λ,A)-TSF when λ > 0.
When λ = 0, we can repeat the derivation of (3) but without the factor ofα−11 , as this is only needed for
the simulated value of items in Qi,ℓ for ℓ > 0 and now these sets are empty. So,
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Xi∩Qi
vi(j) ≤
ρ
∑
e∈Z w(e) and then the analog of (4) is∑
e∈X
w(e) ≤ (2rα0ρ+ ρ)
∑
e∈Z
w(e) ≤ 3ρr 10+1
∑
e∈Z
w(e) .
About the running time, it is easy to see that all steps, except running A(G˜) and finding j∗i for each
i ∈ N , can be done in polynomial time (in particular O(|U | log2 |U |)). Let t(|U |) be the time needed to
check whether an edge can be extended to a feasible solution. en, finding all the j∗i s can be done in
timeO(|U |2t(|U |)), as we need to perform the check for at most |U | − 1 elements per i ∈ N . Hence,
if both the feasibility check and A run in polynomial time, then (λ,A)-TSF runs in polynomial time as
well.
For the problems defined above, we can get the following.
Corollary 3. By choosing A appropriately, (λ,A)-TSF asks at most 1 + λ+ λ log |U | queries and achieves
distortion at most
• 3
( |U |
2
) 1
λ+1 in polynomial time for one-sided matching (thus qualitatively retrieving eorem 2), two-sided
matching, general graph matching, and two-sided perfect matching,
• 3|U2|
1
λ+1 for general resource allocation;
• 3|U | 2λ+1 for max k-sum clustering;
• (4.5 + ε)|U | 1λ+1 for clearing kidney 3-exchanges and (7 + ε)|U | 1λ+1 for clearing kidney 4-exchanges in
polynomial time, for any constant ε ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. We begin with one-sided matching, two-sided matching, and general graph matching. First notice
that the size of any matching is at most |U |/2 and thus r ≤ |U |/2. en, by using an exact algorithm A
for computing maximum weight matchings, such as the blossom algorithm [Edmonds, 1965], eorem 9
directly implies distortion at most 3(|U |/2) 1λ+1 . Regarding the running time, observe that any edge is
already a feasible solution, and thus j∗i is indeed i’s most preferred alternative. Since the blossom algorithm
runs in polynomial time, we get that (λ,A)-TSF runs in polynomial time as well.
For two-sided perfect matching the argument is as above but one needs to argue about efficiently
checking whether a given edge extends to a feasible solution. is, however, is already discussed right
aer the description of (λ,A)-TSF.
For general resource allocation, we only need to see that an assignment is fully determined by exactly
|U2| edges matching the items to the agents. at is, r = |U2|. Since we do not deal with the running time
in this case, we may assume an algorithm A that solves the full-information problem optimally. en,
eorem 9 implies distortion at most 3|U2|
1
λ+1 . It should be noted here that, depending on the additional
constraints imposed by F , the computation of an assignment may vary from easy (e.g., no constraints) to
strongly NP-hard (e.g., the items assigned to each agent should form an independent set in a given graph
H on U2).
For max k-sum clustering, again we do not deal with the running time. us, it suffices to use |U |2 as
a straightforward upper bound for r and the distortion bound follows.
Finally, for clearing kidney ℓ-exchanges, ℓ ∈ {3, 4}, notice that the number of edges defining a col-
lection of disjoint cycles can be at most |U | and thus r ≤ |U |. Fix a constant ε > 0. For clearing kidney
3-exchanges (resp. 4-exchanges), asAweuse the polynomial-time (1.5+δ)-approximation (resp. (7/3+δ)-
approximation) algorithm of Jia et al. [2017] with δ = ε/3. us, eorem 9 implies distortion at most
3(1.5 + ε/3)|U | 1λ+1 = (4.5 + ε)|U | 1λ+1 ,
for 3-exchanges and
3(7/3 + ε/3)|U | 1λ+1 = (7 + ε)|U | 1λ+1 ,
for 4-exchanges. Note that the problem is NP-hard, even when k = 3 [Abraham et al., 2007]. Regarding
the running time, we can efficiently check whether an edge (i, j) is in a feasible solution, as it is equivalent
to checkingwhether (i, j) belongs to a cycle of length at most ℓ. For instance, wemay find a shortest (j, i)-
path in the unweighted version ofG; (i, j) is in a feasible solution if and only if the length of this shortest
path is at most ℓ − 1. Since A also runs in polynomial time, we get that (λ,A)-TSF runs in polynomial
time as well.
7 Conclusion and Open Problems
Our work is the first to study the interplay between elicited information and distortion in one-sidedmatch-
ing, as well as more general graph problems. We have shown several tradeoffs, both in term of possible
distortion guarantees, and inapproximability bounds. Our results suggest that using only a small number
of queries per agent can lead to significant improvements on the distortion.
As future directions, first it would be very interesting to see if we can come up with algorithms that
match the lower bounds of eorem 6. We managed to do that for the class of k-well-structured instances,
but whether it is possible to achieve that for any instance remains to be seen. Perhaps a slightly less
ambitious open problem would be to design an algorithm that outperforms the two-queries algorithm
presented in Section 5 in terms of the achievable tradeoffs, for agents with unit-sum valuation functions.
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Another interesting avenue would be to consider randomized algorithms, either in the selection of the
matching, or the process of querying the agents, and see if we can obtain significant improvements. Finally,
going beyond one-sided matching, one could study more general programs, such as those discussed in
Section 6 and design tailor-made algorithms with improved tradeoffs between distortion and number of
queries per agent.
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